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This short article attempts two tasks. In the first place it
attempts a critical overview of the Portuguese Presidency
Conclusions presented at Santa Maria da Feira (Feira
hereafter) on 19-20 June in so far as the Common
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is
concerned. Second, the Nice summit looms which marks
the conclusion of the Intergovernmental Conference.
Although CFSP issues are addressed in a series of
parallel meetings to the IGC proper, treaty revisions
may be required to
support the aims of the
Portuguese and current
French Presidency if
ESDP is to become
more than bonnes
paroles. The main aim
of the IGC, which has
been apparent since the
European Council’s
Cologne summit, is to
prepare the EU institutions for enlargement and, as
such, relatively few changes if any can be anticipated to
Title V of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) or
related areas. While the main focus of the IGC is
understandable, the ambitious goals of ESDP, which
include the ‘Headline Goals’ that are supposed to be
implemented by 2003, means that any modifications to
the CFSP aspects of the TEU really have to be made now
rather than held-over to the next IGC. In particular, the
momentum that has been built up in the ESDP area may
well necessitate treaty changes that could have a
significant bearing for the EU as a whole. It is then a pity
that the CFSP discussions are confined to a series of
parallel discussions to the IGC-proper since this serves
to denigrate an aspect of the EU’s work that deserves
more transparency.
An Overview and Critique of Feira
The Portuguese Presidency conclusions at Feira give
room for both optimism regarding ESDP but also
concern. The fact that the Presidency conclusions
devoted a considerable amount of space, including one
entire appendix, to ESDP testifies to its importance in
terms of furthering the ability of the EU ‘to assert its
identity on the international scene’, in the words of the
Treaty on European Union.
The task of the
Portuguese Presidency
in so far as ESDP was
concerned was to steer
forward the agenda set
into motion at St. Malo
and, in the case of the
non-military aspects of
crisis management, at
the Amsterdam IGC.1
It was in this latter area
that most progress was made with the establishment of
a Committee for civilian aspects of crisis management
in May 2000 as well as proposals for a Rapid Reaction
Facility and fund. As a counterpart to Helsinki’s military
‘Headline Goals’, it was also agreed that the EU Member
States should be able to provide up to 5,000 police
officers for international missions across the range of
conflict prevention and crisis management operations
by 2003. The military aspects of crisis management saw
some progress under the Portuguese Presidency but the
central issue remains whether the EU Member States
will actually devote the resources necessary to achieve
the ‘Headline Goals’. Whether the goals will be so much
hot air or the beginning of a genuine conflict management
capability will become evident at the Capabilities
Commitment Conference to be held in Brussels on 20-
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21 November.2
The issue of how to avoid the ‘discrimination’
aspects of Madeleine Albright’s ‘3 D’s’ (the others
being duplication and decoupling) assumed much
attention at Feira. A variety of interim and permanent
modalities for dialogue, consultation and cooperation
were provided for by the Portuguese Presidency at
EU+6 format (EU plus the six non-EU European NATO
members)3 or EU+15 (as before, plus candidates for EU
accession). It is not entirely clear how any meaningful
consultation or cooperation will respect the decision-
making autonomy of the EU and its single institutional
framework. Nor is it apparent that the non-EU countries
will appreciate being
lumped together into a
‘single, inclusive struc-
ture’.
Strains may also be-
come apparent between
NATO and the EU since
it was made apparent at
Feira that, ‘Upon a
decision by the Council
to launch an operation,
the non-EU NATO
members will particip-
ate if they so wish, in
the event of an operation
requiring recourse to NATO assets and capabilities’. In
the event that NATO assets are not used they will, ‘on
a decision by the Council,’ be invited to take part. The
Council position seems to assume that there is more pre-
delegated authority to use key NATO assets than may in
fact be the case and it could also be construed by NATO
as an attempt to force the release of the required assets
under political duress. Furthermore, it is far from apparent
that the EU and NATO are yet able to deal with each
other ‘on an equal footing’ as the Portuguese Presidency
maintains in its ‘Principles for Consultation’ between
the organisations.
EU-NATO relations still require much attention and
it is questionable whether the French Presidency will be
able to make much progress on this when their own
rapprochement with NATO is stalled. One of the more
controversial aspects of making a reality of the ESDP
will be the introduction of what could be termed a
security culture into the predominantly civil structures
of the Union. NATO as well as individual EU Member
States are right to be concerned about the notoriously
leak prone EU. Symptomatic of this problem was the
decision by the High Representative for CFSP to
introduce a tough new code on the protection of classified
information applicable to the General Secretariat of the
Council, which may include not only new internal
practices but physical structures to enhance security,
prompted allegations that a ‘security state’ and an ‘end
to EU openness’ were in the offing.4 Detractors were
quick to point out that the new rules would undermine
Article 255 of the Treaty on European Communities,
which guarantees public access to EU documents, as
well as Article 28 of the Treaty on European Union
which explicitly applies Article 255 to the Common
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The applicability
of Article 255 to the CFSP will presumably be addressed
as part of the possible treaty revisions to Title V of the
Treaty on European Union. This aside, the new code
illustrates the sensitivity of introducing the necessary
practices for handling materials at a level where NATO
members will feel comfortable with sharing information
which, in turn, is an essential aspect of any enhanced
EU-NATO relations. Ten EU Member States agreed to
the new restrictions (the Netherlands, Finland and
Sweden voted against).5
Aside from this, the
French Presidency in
the lead up to the Nice
summit promises to be
of considerable interest
for two further reasons.
First, the EU’s concen-
tration on its relations
with NATO under the
Portuguese Presidency
was, presumably, based
on the premise that the
WEU has ‘completed
its purpose’. Indications
from June 2000 suggest that the European Security and
Defence Assembly (the revamped WEU Parliamentary
Assembly) is not going to disappear. Moreover, there
may be some good arguments for retaining the WEU
based on the predictability of the divisive nature of the
debates that would ensue if Article 17 of the TEU were
subject to substantial amendment, which would occur if
the WEU ceased to exist.
Second, it is far from clear that France and Britain
(as well as others) understand the same thing by the
search for ‘the capacity for autonomous action’
mentioned at St. Malo. The task of continuing the
dialogue with NATO will make it difficult for the
French administration not to be clearer about what they
understand by ‘autonomy’ – and, hence, for others as
well.
In conclusion, if the ‘Headline Goals’ are to be
attained by 2003, the results of the Portuguese Presidency
have to be developed in concrete and not merely
rhetorical ways. The Capabilities Commitment
Conference will provide perhaps the most important
litmus test about whether the EU Member States are
willing to match vision with reality. If they do not,
ESDP will be so many bonnes paroles.
The IGC and Nice
The parallel ESDP discussions for the IGC reflect two
sets of position that, for the sake of simplicity, we shall
call the minimalist and maximalist positions. The former
argue that Title V of the Treaty on European Union
(TEU) requires little or no alteration while the latter
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suggest that the TEU may require major alteration. Both
will be examined in turn.
The minimalists base their argument on the inherent
flexibility of Title V of the TEU and the associated
articles relevant to the
CFSP. Flexibility was
deliberately built into
the Amsterdam Treaty
and especially in the
second pillar where
often competing views
called for general, if not
vague, language. Thus,
the in-built flexibility
would, for the mini-
malists, cover most if
not all of the structural
changes and develop-
ments discussed above
and below.
It could therefore be
argued that the institu-
tional modifications to
the second pillar deci-
sion-making structures
(the Political and
Security Committee, the
Military Committee and
the Military Staff) take
their legal character from Article 25 of the TEU. Conflict
prevention, which is not officially a ‘Petersberg task’
and does not therefore explicitly appear in Article 11,
could nevertheless be implicit (since CFSP covers ‘all
questions relating to the security of the Union’).6 The
duties of the High Representative need, to some, further
definition. To those who do not agree with this position,
they are already outlined in the treaty as it stands.
Similarly, closer relations with other security
organisations (such as NATO) may not call for treaty
revision since there is sufficient latitude in the existing
wording to allow for
enhanced links.
The WEU poses the
largest challenge to the
minimalist position
since if it disappears
altogether Article 17 of
the TEU would require
extensive (and contro-
versial) revision. If, as
the Cologne Presidency
conclusions observed,
the WEU will have
‘completed its purpose’
after the Petersberg-
relevant tasks are trans-
ferred to the EU, the WEU will no longer be ‘an integral
part of the development of the Union’, it will not provide
‘access to an operational capability’, nor will it ‘support
the Union in framing the defence aspects’ of the CFSP.
The possibility of revising Article 17 to compensate for
the WEU’s disappearance would necessitate a major
debate focusing on who frames the defence aspects of
the ESDP and who pro-
vides access to an
operational capability –
issues that are of special
sensitivity for the EU’s
neutral and non-aligned
members as well as a
number of non-EU
NATO members. Even
if the WEU continues
to survive, minus its
Petersberg compon-
ents, the issue of whe-
ther those components
that have been trans-
ferred need treaty status
still needs addressing.
By way of contrast,
the maximalist position
relies not so much on
legal niceties but more
upon the political need
to explain how the rapid
development of ESDP
should be reflected in a
modified TEU. Unlike the minimalists, the maximalist
stance would agree that although flexibility or enhanced
cooperation was introduced as a result of the Amsterdam
modifications to the TEU, this did not extend to security
and defence policy. Primarily for political reasons it
might therefore be desirable to explain, for instance,
how the existing treaty-based structures co-exist with
the new interim structures, as well as any transferred
WEU structures, and to elaborate upon their mandates.
The Political and Security Committee (COPS), Military
Staff and Military Committee alongside the Satellite
Centre, the Institute for
Security Studies and
other transferred struc-
tures should therefore
be incorporated into the
treaty. The likelihood
of confusion or even
friction between the
new interim compon-
ents and, for example
COREPER, has to be
considered as well.
The question of
when the interim struc-
tures become perma-
nent remains open (al-
though there is already pressure to move them rapidly
towards permanent status) and it might usefully be
deliberated in the parallel CFSP talks whether there is
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any sustainable logic in having a Political Committee as
well as a permanent  COPS. Given the infrequent
meetings of the Political Committee and the high-level
representation of COPS, the case for COPS assuming
the role of the Political Committee would seem
compelling. By extension, the question of who should
be responsible for military-level cooperation (including
defence industrial as-
pects) is also likely to
surface. The use of
informal or ad hoc
meetings of the EU
defence ministers hints
at the possible utility of
considering what form-
al arrangements might
be made for the defence
ministers to meet at the
level of Council.
The maximalist position is strengthened if some
components of the WEU, such as the Security and
Defence Assembly, continue to exist and lay claim to
some elements of the ‘transferred’ components (under
the current Title V the WEU remains an ‘integral part of
the development of the Union’). Whilst addressing the
structural aspects of CFSP, maximalists may also argue
for further elaboration of the High Representative’s
duties, especially in light of the increasingly compli-
cated (and occasionally clashing) EU representation in
external relations. The mandate and status of the new
interim structures, especially COPS, may also be relevant
since a case could be
made for specification
that the High Repre-
sentative should preside
over the new structures.
This would have the
advantage of not only
increasing consistency
between the WEU (at
least for the meanwhile)
but also NATO since
the High Representative
is not only Secretary-
General of the WEU but also responsible for liaison
with NATO’s Secretariat. Specification of the role of
the High Representative (and, by default, the Presidency)
may also avoid the obvious difficulties of consistency
when a non-WEU and/or non-NATO EU member
assumes the Presidency.
The rapid development of non-military crisis
management in the second pillar, most notably at Feira,
must not be at the cost of the role of the Commission.
Closer coordination will be required between the
Council, Commission and the Council Secretariat since
all have a legitimate role in a variety of non-military
aspects of crisis management. Although this may not
necessitate treaty revision, it nevertheless underscores
the need for the Council and Commission to take
seriously their treaty-based responsibility for
consistency. The addition of new non-military and
military crisis management tasks also increases the
pressure on the Presidency Troika to work in a
complementary and non-competitive manner.
The development of relations with NATO, as
specified at Feira, might also call for treaty revision,
especially in so far as
the right of association
of non-EU NATO mem-
bers is concerned. Cur-
rently a number of non-
EU NATO members
have been granted non-
treaty based rights with
regard to crisis manage-
ment. In particular the
need to ensure that
ESDP is compatible with the security and defence
policy established with the NATO framework may
require some buttressing of the wording of Article 17
TEU and, more generally, Title V.
Finally, the maximalist position could also argue
from a legal standpoint that revision is necessary since
a number of articles in the TEU and TEC could be
contradictory. For instance, Article 11 (2) TEU obliges
Member States to support the Union’s external and
security policy ‘actively and unreservedly in a spirit of
loyalty and mutual solidarity’ while Article 23 allows
for an EU Member State to block a QMV vote for
‘important and stated reasons of national policy’ in the
context of joint actions
and common positions
adopted on the basis of
a common strategy (the
latter being adopted
unanimously). General-
ly, the stipulations of
Article 23, especially
the double veto, are
cumbersome and in
urgent need of review.
The stipulations in
Article 17 of the TEU
regarding the field of armaments may also be at variance
with Article 296 TEC.
On a less specific level, the whole question of
CFSP’s ‘democratic deficit’ may also surface and, in
particular, with reference to the European Parliament’s
marginal role. A case can clearly be made for more
legitimacy, especially with regard to sensitive issues of
security and defence, and this will presumably mean
deepening the involvement of both the EP as well as
national parliaments. This could make for an interesting
showdown between the WEU’s European Security and
Defence Assembly and the EP.
As is often the case, the IGC will probably continue
to uphold the flexibility of Title V of the TEU and
amendments will probably tend more towards the
Revision is necessary since a number of
articles in the TEU and TEC could be
contradictory.
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minimalist position. What will be of profound interest
will be the fate of the WEU since if it has indeed
‘completed its purpose’ it will mean a revision of Article
17 which is at the heart of not only CFSP but future
relations with NATO. In the absence of the WEU the EU
Member States would have some uncomfortable
questions to ask such as: who is responsible for defence
(a question of particular interest to the neutral and non-
aligned EU Member States) and who provides the EU
with ‘access to an operational capability’? Possible
solutions might include a new declaration attached to
the TEU which incorporates Article V of the Modified
Brussels Treaty but which would initially bind the ten
full WEU member states (although the declaration
could of course be left open for others to associate).
Alternatively (and less likely) references to the WEU in
Article 17 TEU and elsewhere could in most cases
substitute ‘ESDP’ in place of the WEU. The second
question will be answered prior to the conclusion of the
IGC at the Capabilities Commitment Conference and
this may have profound effects for not only the French
Presidency conclusions but the future shape and form of
ESDP.
Conclusions
The most important outcome of the European Council’s
Feira summit for the future of ESDP is the provision for
the Capabilities Commitment Conference to be convened
in November. This is, to use the Americanism, where
the rubber hits the road. A lacklustre outcome of the
conference will challenge the credibility of not only the
‘Headline Goals’ but also ESDP and, more generally,
CFSP. If the EU’s ambition is to assert its role on the
international scene, then both Bosnia and Kosovo have
illustrated only too well that in addition to diplomatic
intercession and economic leverage (both positive and
negative), the Union has to be endowed with the ability
to credibly threaten the use of military force and, if
necessary, to use it. The parallel CFSP discussions to the
IGC should bear this in mind.
Finally, it is not clear how the parallel discussions on
CFSP will be merged into the final stages of the IGC. It
is however clear that flexibility has its limits and political
developments since 1998 demand treaty revisions to
Title V and other select articles, even if legal quibbles
suggest the need for minimal changes. The EU is on the
brink of what could be one of the most profound
changes in its history and, ironically, this is being
discussed in the recesses of a parallel process while the
focus is on adapting existing EU institutions for the
enlargement of the Union. The growing presence of
khaki in the corridors of the EU institutions suggests not
only that the EU is becoming something of a hybrid, a
civilian power as well as a security actor, but that the
practices and codes of the former must be adapted to
allow for the latter.
________________
NOTES
1 The Joint Declaration issued at the British-French Summit,
St Malo, 4 December 1998, made a call for the Union to
have ‘the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by
credible military forces, the means to decide to use them,
and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to subsequent
crises’. Subsequent bilateral or multilateral statements
have built upon elements of the St. Malo declaration. For
an overview of these and other developments with regard
to ESDP see, S. Duke (ed.), Between Vision and Reality:
CFSP’s Progress on the Path to Maturity, (Maastricht:
European Institute of Public Administration, 2000).
2 In spite of criticism of some of the non-EU NATO members
as well as some Europe Agreement countries, the conference
is to include only the EU15 although provision will be
made after the conference for non-EU contributions.
3 Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Poland and
Turkey. This implicitly leaves open the question of what
arrangements will be made for cooperation with the two
North American NATO members.
4 Decision of the Secretary-General of the Council/High
Representative for the Common Foreign and Security
Policy, on measures for the protection of classified
information applicable to the General Secretariat of the
Council, 27 July 2000, 2000/C 239/01. For reactions see
Statewatch, ‘Solana Plans for the Security State and an End
to EU Openness agreed’, at http://www.statewatch.org/jlu
100/05solana.htm.
5 The cabinet of the Netherlands government decided on 22
September to take the Council of the EU to the European
Court of Justice over the decision to change the EU code on
public access to documents. The cabinet observed, amongst
other things, that the decision violated the right of public
access to documents enshrined in Article 255 (TEC). The
Legal Affairs Committee of the European Parliament also
voted in favour of legal action against the Council on 13
September.
6 The WEU’s 1992 Petersberg tasks were incorporated into
the Treaty of Amsterdam following the Amsterdam IGC
and they consist of ‘humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-
keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis
management, including peacemaking’. 